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l. l INTRODUCTION 
Inflation targeting (IT) is the new orthodoxy of mainstream macroeco­
nomic thought. The approach has now been adopted by 24 central banks, 
and many more, including those in developing countries, are expressing 
serious interest in following suit. Initially adopted by New Zealand in 
1990, the norms surrounding the IT regime have been so powerful that 
the central banks of both the industrialized and the developing economies 
alike have declared that maintaining price stability at the lowest possible 
rate of inflation is their only mandate. It was generally believed that price 
stability is a pre-condition for sustained growth and employment, and that 
'high' inflation is damaging the economy in the long run. 
In broad terms, the IT policy framework involves 'the public announce­
ment of inflation targets, coupled with a credible and accountable com­
mitment on the part of government policy authorities to the achievement 
of these targets' (Setterfiel<l, 2006, p. 653). As advocated, 'full fledged' 
inflation targeting consists of five components: absence of other nominal 
anchors, such as exchange rates or nominal GDP; an institutional com­
mitment to price stability; absence of fiscal dominance; policy (instrument) 
independence; and policy transparency and accountability (Bernanke et 
al., 1999; Mishkin and Schmi<lt-Hebbel, 2001, p.3). In practice, while few 
central banks reach the 'ideal' of being 'full fledged' inflation targeters, 
many others still focus on fighting inflation to the virtual exclusion of 
other goals. 
For its proponents, the appropriate inflation target is typically pre­
scribed as maintaining price stability, though there is less agreement on 
the meaning of this term and on its precise measurement. Many prac­
titioners simply adopt the widely cited definition of Alan Greenspan, the 
former Governor of the US Fed, issued at the July 1996 meeting of the 
Federal Open Market Committee, a� ·a rate of inflation that is sufficiently 
low that households and businesses do not have to take it into account in 
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making every day decisions'. For Feldstein ( 1997), however, price stability 
meant a long-run inflation rate or zero. In addition, IT is usually associ­
ated with appropriate changes in the central bank law that enhances the 
independence of the institution (Bernanke et al., 1999, p. 102; Mishkin and 
Schmidt-Hebbel, 2001, p. 8; see also Buiter, 2006 for an evaluation). Note 
that this promotion of central bank independence often is inconsistent 
with the above mentioned commitment to accountability, if by account­
ability, one means democratic accountability. 
Ironically, employment creation has dropped off the direct agenda of 
most central banks just as the problems of global unemployment, under­
employment and poverty arc taking center stage as critical world issues 
(Heintz, 2006). The International Labour Organization (ILO) estimates 
that in 2003 approximately 186 million people were jobless, the highest 
level ever recorded ( l LO, 2004a). The employment to population ratio - a 
measure of unemployment- has fallen in the last decade, from 63.3 percent 
to 62.5 percent (ILO, 2004). And as the quantity of jobs relative to need has 
fallen, there is also a significant global problem with respect to the quality 
of jobs. The I LO estimates that 22 percent of the developing world's 
workers earn less than $1 a day and 1.4 billion ( or 57 percent of the devel­
oping world's workers) earn less than $2 a day. To reach the Millennium 
Development Goal of halving the share of working poor by 2015, sus­
tained, robust economic growth will be required. The 1 LO estimates that 
on average, real GDP growth has to be maintained at 4.7 percent per year 
to reduce the share of$ I a day poverty by half by 2015, and significantly 
more than that to reduce the share of $2 a day poverty by half. 
Moreover, China's and India's opening up to the global markets and the 
collapse of the Soviet system together have added 1.5 billion new workers 
to the world's economically active population (Freeman, 2004, 2005; 
Akyuz, 2006). This means almost a doubling of the global labor force and 
a reduction of the global capital-labor ratio by half. Concomitant with the 
emergence of the developing countries in the global manufacturing trade, 
about 90 percent of the labor employed in world merchandise trade is low 
skilled and unskilled, suffering from marginalization and all too frequent 
violation of basic worker rights in informalized markets (see, for example, 
Akyuz, 2003, 2006; Akyuz et al., 2006). 
Under these conditions, a large number of developing countries have 
suffered de-industrialization, serious informalization and consequent 
worsening of the position of wage-labor, resulting in a deterioration of 
income distribution and increased poverty. Many of these phenomena 
have occurred in tandem with the onset of neoliberal conditionalities� 
imposing rapid liberalization of trade and premature deregulation of the 
indigenous financial markets. 
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The key problem is that the ongoing 'financial globalization' appears 
primarily to redistribute shrinking investment funds and limited jobs 
across countries, rather than to accelerate capital accumulation across a 
global scale (Adelman and Yeldan, 2000; Akyuz, 2006). Simply put, the 
world economy is growing too slowly to generate sufficient jobs and it is 
allocating a smaller proportion of its income to fixed capital formation. 
Jn addition, asset price bubbles and crashes, with their attendant nnancial 
fall-c:nit are plaguing the system. Under these conditions, it OLlght to be 
clear that price stability, on its own, will not suflice to maintain macro­
economiL: stability, as it cannot suflice to secure financial stability and 
employment growth. In the words of Akyuz (2006, p. 46), 'the source <�/' 
nwcroeconomic instability now is not instability in product markets but 
asset markets, and the main challenge for policy makers i.,· not i,?flation, but 
unemployment and.financial instability' (emphasis added). 
Yet, surprisingly, despite a disappointing record, this almost single minded 
focus on commodity inflation is gaining a more secure foothold in monetary 
policy cirdes and the circles are widening to include an increasing number 
of developing countries. According to a recent report by the International 
Monetary Fund OMF), an increasing number of central banks in emerging 
markets are planning to adopt IT as their operating framework (llatini et 
al., 2006; Table 1.1 ). An IM F staff survey of 88 non-industrial countries 
found that more than half expressed a desire to move to explicit or implicit 
quantitative inflation targets. More relevant to our concerns, nearly three­
quarters of these countries expressed an interest in moving to 'full-fledged' 
IT by 2010. To support and encourage this movement, the !MF is provid­
ing technical assistance to many of these countries and is willing to provide 
more (Table 1.1 and further discussion below). In addition, the IMF is 
considering altering its conditionality and monitoring structures to indude 
inflation targets. In short, despite little evidence concerning the success of 
IT in its promotion of economic growth, employment creation and poverty 
reduction, and mixed evidence at best that it actually reduces inflation itself, 
a substantial momentum is building up for full-fledged IT in developing 
countries. Promotion efforts by the IMF and Western-trained economists 
are at least partly responsible for this increasing popularity. 
While it r;1ight seem obvious that stabilization focused monetary policy 
represents the only proper role for central banks, in fact looking at history 
casts serious doubt on this daim. Far from being the historical norm, in 
many of the successful currently developed countries, as well as in many 
developing countries in the post-Second World War period, pursuing 
development objectives was seen as a crucial part of the central banks' 
tasks (Epstein, 2007). Now, by contrast, development has dropped off the 
policy agenda of central banks in most developing countries. 
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Tahle I.I lr!flation targeting countries: initial conditions and modalities 
Developing countries IT Inflation Current Officially 
(in order of adoption) adoption rate at inflation declared 
date start target policy 
('Yr, per ('Y., per instrument 
annum) annum) 
Israel 1997Q2 8.5 1-3 headline 0/N 
rate 
Czech Rep. 1998Ql 13.1 J (+/-!) 2 week repo 
Poland 1998Q4 9.9 2.5 (+/-!) 28 day 
intervention 
Brazil 1999Q2 3.J 4.5 ( +/- -2) selie 0/N rate 
Chile 1999Q3 2.9 2 .. 4 0/N rate 
Colombia 1999Q3 9.J 5 ( +/-0.5) repo 
South Africa 2000Ql 2.3 J-6 
Thailand 2000Q2 1.7 0 -3.5 14 day repo 
Korea 2001QI 3.2 2.5-3.5 0/N call rate 
Mexico 2001QI 8.1 3 (+/-1) 91-day Cetes 
Hungary 2001Q2 10.5 3.5 (+/--1) 2 week deposit 
Peru 2002QI -0.8 2.5(+/-1) 
The Philippines 2002QI 3.8 5 -6 reverse repo 
Slovak Republic 2005Ql 3.2 3.5 (+/-!) 
Indonesia 2005Q3 7.8 5.5 (+/. I) I-month SBJ 
Romania 2005Q3 8.8 7.5(+/-I) 
Turkey·• 2006QI 7.8 5 ( +/-2) CB 0/N rate 
Turkey" 2001Q2 82.0 n.a CB net 
domestic assets 
Industrial Countries 
New Zealnnd 1990QI 7.0 1-3 cash rate 
Canada 199JQI 6.2 j •. 3 0/N funding 
rate 
United Kingdom 1992Q4 3.6 2 repo 
Sweden 1993QI 4.8 2 (+/-1) repo 
Australia 1993Q2 1.9 2-3 cash rate 
Iceland 2001QI 3.9 2.5 
Norway 2001Ql 3.7 2.5 
Candidate Countries 
Costa Rica. Egypt, Near Term 
Ukraine (I 2 years) 
Albania. Armenia, Medium 
Botswana, Term 0 -5 
Dominican years) 
lmp(l(.:/s mu/ policy alternatives 





Serbia, Sri Lanka, 
Vietnam, Zambia 
Belarus, China, 
Kenya, Kyrgyz Rep., 
Moldova, Serbia, 
Sri Lanka, Vietnam, 
Zambia 
Bolivia, Honduras, 









(> 5 years) 
a. Oflicial adoption datt: for Turkey. 
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b. Turkish ccntrnl bm1k declared 'disguised inOation targeting' in the aftermath or the 2001 
February crisis. 
So11rce: 13atini et al. (2006). 
The theme of this book is that modern central banking ought to have 
more policy space in balancing out various objectives and instruments. 
In particular, employment creation, poverty reduction and more rapid 
economic growth should join inflation stabilization and stabilization more 
generally as key goals of central bank policy. In introducing this volume, 
this chapters outlines why a shift away from IT, the increasingly fashion­
able, but problematic approach to central bank policies, and a move 
toward a more balanced approach is both desirable and feasible. 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In the next section, we 
briefly survey the macroeconomic record of IT and its current structure. 
Section 1.3 focuses on the role of the exchange rate as one of the key macro 
prices, and discusses alternative theories of its determination. We also 
make remarks on the issue of IT in the context of the so-called 'trilemma' 
of monetary policy. In Section 1.4 we discuss various alternatives to infla­
tion focused central banks, concentrating on the results of a multi-country 
research project undertaken with the support of UN-DESA, among other 
organizations. This section shows that there are viable, socially productive 
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alternatives to IT, including those that focus on employment generation, 
and makes the case that these alternatives should be further developed. 
Section 1 .5 concludes the chapter. 
l .2 MACROECONOMIC RECORD OF INFLATION 
TARGETING 
Much of the existing literature on the record of IT has focused mostly on 
whether systemic risks and accompanying volatility has been reduced in the 
IT economies, and whether inflation has come down actually in response to 
adoption of the framework itself or due to a set of 'exogenously welcome' 
factors. On the one side, there is a fair amount of agreement that IT has 
been associated with reductions in inflation. Furthermore, exchange rate 
pass-through effects were reportedly reduced and consumer prices have 
become less prone to shocks (Edwards, 2005; Mishkin and Schmidt­
Hebbel, 2001 ). Yet existing evidence also suggests that IT has not yielded 
inflation below the levels attained by the industrial non-targeters that have 
adopted other monetary regimes (Ball and Sheridan, 2003; Mishkin and 
Scmidt-Hcbbel, 2001; Roger and Stone, 2005). Moreover, even if domestic 
monetary policy has reduced inflation, the hoped for gains in economic 
growth and employment have, generally, not materialized. 
On the 'qualitative' policy front, it is generally argued that with the 
onset of central bank independence, communication and transparency 
have improved and that the central banks have become more 'account­
able'. Yet in practice, 'central bank independence' means that central 
banks have become less accountable to their governments, and, arguably, 
more accountable to financial elites and international organizations such 
as the IMF. 
Moreover, little is known about the true costs of IT on potential output 
growth, employment, and on incidence of poverty and income distri­
bution. Bernanke et al. ( 1999) and Epstein (2007), for instance, report 
evidence that IT central banks do not reduce inflation at any lower cost 
than other countries' central banks in terms of foregone output. That is, 
IT does not appear to increase the credibility of central bank policy and 
therefore does not appear to reduce the sacrifice rati_s>(.Per contra, based 
on an econometric study of a large sample of inflation targeters and non­
targeters, Corbo et al. (200 I) concluded that sacrifice ratios have declined 
in the emerging market economies after adoption of IT. They also report 
that output volatility has fallen in both emerging and industrialized 
economies after adopting IT. This position is recently complemented by 
a study of the IMF economists, who, using a complex econometric model 
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and policy simulations, report findings that inflation targeting economies 
experience reductions in the volatility in inflation, without experiencing 
increased volatility in real variables such as real GDP (Batini et al., 2006). 
According to these estimates, IT central banks do enhance economic 'sta­
bility' relative to other monetary rules, such as pegged exchange rates and 
monetary rules. 
However, in the assessments of 'stability', these papers do not consider 
the issue of the stability of asset prices, including exchange rates, stock 
prices and other financial asset pricey As we discuss further below, asset 
price stability may need to be included in a full analysis of the impact oflT 
on overall economic stability. Asset price stability aside, while intriguing, 
these results are only as strong as the simulation model on which they are 
based and are only as relevant as the relevance of the questions they pose. 
Moreover, they are only as broad as the alternatives they explore. On all 
these scores, these results are problematic. First, they do not simulate the 
impact of IT relative to other possible policy regimes, such as targeting the 
real exchange rate as discussed below. Second)he model is based on esti­
mates of potential output that are themselves affected by monetary policy 
(see, for example, Michl, 2007; Tobin, 1980). Hence, if monetary policy 
slows economic growth, it also lowers the rate or growth of potential 
output and, therefore, reduces the gap between the two, thereby appearing 
to stabilize the economy. 
Equally, if not more important, is the practical problematique of setting 
the targeted rate of inflation itself. Even if the advocated requisites of the 
IT regime are taken for g,:�mted, it is not yet clear what the practically 
targeted rate of inflation should be. Even though there appears to be a 
consensus among the advocates of the IT regime that the inflation target 
has to be 'as low as possible', there is no theoretical justification of this 
assertion; and as such, it sounds more of a recommendation than a careful 
calculation. Most disturbing is the common belief that what is good for 
the industrialized/developed market economies should simply be repli­
cated by the developing countries as well. That this may not be the case 
is forcefully argued in Poll in and Zhu (2006). Based on their non-linear 
regression estimates of the relationship between inllation and economic 
growth for 80 countries over the period 196 1 -2000, Pollin and Zhu report 
that higher inflation is associated with moderate gains in GDP growth up 
to a roughly 15--18 percent inflation threshold. Furthermore they report 
that there is no justification for IT policies as they are currently being 
practiced throughout the middle-and low-income countries, that is, to 
maintain inflation with a 2 -4 percent band. 
Moreover, we have other evidence on the negative consequences of 
monetary policy designed to produce extremely low levels of inflation in 
10  Beyond i1!flatio11 Wrgeting 
developing counlries. Braunslein and Heintz show that contractionary 
monetary policy used to fight inflation often has a differentially negative 
impact on the employment rates or women relative to men (Braunstein 
and Heintz, Chapter 5, this volume). Given the possible negative costs 
of IT on output and employment, there should be some direct survey 
evidence indicating people's preferences with respect to inflation and 
unemployment. While some studies have indicated that people have an 
absolute preference for low inflation, Arjun Jayadcv (Chapter 4, this 
volume) reports on survey results asking people in different countries 
and income levels what is their bigger concern, high inflation or high 
unemployment. His main result is that, in his sample, poorer people are 
concerned more about high unemployment than high inflation, while 
richer respondents have the opposite preferences. Hence, concerns over 
employment and inflation probably have an important class dimension 
to them, something that economists and historians have suspected for 
many years. 
Finally, is the issue of the role or IT in the context of supply shocks, 
which periodically affect individual economies and, as we have seen 
recently, the world economy as a whole/Rigid IT rules can prove highly 
( problematic in the context of supply shocks, where the main problem 
facing countries is too little supply, not too much demand/rhe solution 
is to help the economy absorb the loss of real income associated with the 
supply shock, without incurring collateral damage associated with greater 
income loss than absolutely necessary, while at the same time making the 
investments necessary to increase the supply of the key commodities or 
find substitutes for them over the medium term. Contractionary monetary 
policy is a decidedly highly inefficient tool for carrying out this complex 
task. This problem is exacerbated by rigid inflation targets and is only 
slightly ameliorated by the use of 'core inflation' indices which usually 
ostensibly exclude the first round costs or volatile energy and food prices. 
This is only a partial solution because in the medium term the increased 
costs of key commodities must filter their way through the input output 
structure and, even without real wage resistance on the part of workers 
which the central banks are presumably concerned with, will raise the core 
inflation rate temporarily. Hence, rigid adherence to IT in this context will 
lead to possibly large unnecessary costs in slower economic growth and 
mcome. 
An overall picture on the selected macroeconomic indicators of the 
inflation targeters can be obtained from Tables 1 .2 and 1.3. In Table 
I .2 we provide information on the observed behavior of selected macro 
aggregates as the annual average of five years before the adoption of the 
IT versus the annual average after the adoption date to the current period. 
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Table 1.3 keeps the same calendar frames and reports data on key macro 
prices, viz. the exchange rate and the interest rates. 
Evidence on the growth performance of the IT countries is mixed. 
Taking the numbers of Table 1.2 at face value, we see that seven of the 21 
countries report a decline in the average annual rate of real growth, while 
three countries (Canada, Hungary and Thailand) have not experienced 
much of a shift in their rates of growth. Yet clearly it is quite hard to dis­
entangle the effects of the IT regime from other direct and indirect effects 
on growth. One such factor is the recent financial glut in the global asset 
markets and the associated surge of the household deficit spending bubble, 
which is now bursting. The Institute of lnternational Finance data reveal, 
for instance, that the net capital inflows to the developing economics as 
a whole has increased from $47 billion in 1998, to almost $400 billion in 
2006, surpassing their peak before the Asian crisis of 1997. As the exces­
sive capital accumulation in telecommunications and the dot.corn high 
tech industries phased out in late 1990s, the global financial markets seem 
to have entered another phase of expansion, and external effects such as 
these make it hard to isolate the growth impacts of the IT regimes. 
Despite the inconclusive verdict on the growth front, the figures on unem­
ployment indicate a significant increase in the post-IT era. Only three coun­
tries on our list (Chile, Mexico and Switzerland) report a modest decline 
in their rates of unemployment in comparison to the pre-IT averages. The 
deterioration of employment performance is especially pronounced (and 
puzzling) in countries such as the Philippines, Peru and Turkey where rapid 
growth rates were attained. The increased severity of unemployment at the 
global scale seems to have affected the IT countries equally strongly, and 
the theoretical expectation that 'price stability would bring growth and 
employment in the long run' seems quite far from materializing yet. 
The adjustment patterns on the balance of foreign trade have been 
equally diverse. Ten of the 2 1  countries in Table 1.2 achieved higher 
(improved) trade surpluses (balances). While there have been large deficit 
countries, such as Turkey, Mexico, the Philippines and Australia, there 
were also sizable surplus generators such as Brazil, Korea, Thailand, 
Canada and Sweden. Not surprisingly much of the behavior of the trade 
balance could be explained by the extent of over-valuation of the exchange 
ratcs
,,
/fhis information is tabulated in Table 1.3. 
Thble 1.3, like Table 1.2, calculates the annual averages of the five-year 
period before the IT versus annual averages after IT to date. Focusing on 
the inflation-adjusted real exchange rate movements, we find a general 
tendency towards appreciated currencies in the aftermath of adoption 
of the IT regimes. Mexico, Indonesia, Korea and Turkey are the most 
significant currency appreciating countries, while Brazil, and to some 
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Tahle 1.2 Selected macroeconomic aggregates in the ir!/lation targeting 
countries 
l.leforc : Annual average of 5 years prior to adoption or IT: After : Annu,11 average or 
adoption of IT to current 
Growth Unemploy- Trade Balance Central bank 
rate ment rate (external foreign Tl'Servcs 




Year IT Before After Before After Before After Before After 
started 
New Zealand 1990 2.7 3.0 4.2 6.9 0.4 1.3 2897.9 4623.2 
Canada 1991 2.9 2.8 8.4 8.7 0.5 2.7 1 1 964.0 24256.0 
United 
Kingdom 1992 2.2 2.7 7.4 5.2 -2.5 -1.6 39666.5 37408.5 
Sweden 1993 0.8 2.7 2.8 6.1 1.3 6.2 15  399.0 18521.8 
Australia 1994 2.2 3.9 8.6 7.3 -0.6 .. 1 .3 13 777.9 20337.1 
Israel 1997 5.8 3.1 8.5 9.4 14.6 - 7.2 7 567.3 24421.  l 
Czech Rep:' 1998 4.5 3.2 4.0 8.9 -3.4 -1.8 9 1 72.5 2 1 686.5 
Poland 1998 7.9 3.7 14.3 16.7 0.0 - 4. 1 1 2  591.8 3 1 58 1 .8 
Urazilh 1999 3.2 2.3 7.0 9.8 I. 7 1.0 47701.3 42304.5 
Colombia 1999 3.3 2.3 1 1 .  l 15.8 6.0 0.5 7 567.3 24421 . 1  
Mexico 1999 1.7 4.8 2.7 1.9 · 0.5 -1.9 20630.9 5 1 396.6 
South Africa•· 2000 2.6 3.8 n.a 27.7 0.0 0.0 1 5 860.0 9580.0 
Switzerland 2000 1.4 1 .7 4.1 3. 1  0.1  0.1  38 277. l 40646.5 
Thailand 2000 1 .5 1.7 1.9 2.4 0.0 0.1 32556.l 40474.8 
Korea 2001 4.6 4.5 4.4 3.7 0.0 0.0 55299.5 157739.2 
Hungary 2001 4.2 4.2 8.0 6.1 -1.3 2.9 9918.1 13652.1 
Peru" 2002 2.0 5.2 7.8 I0.2 -3.2 -0.4 9264.8 1 1 222.9 
Philippines 2002 3.1 5.1 10.2 1 1 .5 3.6 - 0.7 1 1  281.6 14006.6 
Indonesia 2005 4.6 5.6 6.5 10.3 7.3 4.6 3 1  326.7 32989.2 
Turkey• 2006 4.5 7.8 9.9 10.4 -9.8 1 1 .0 33 237.4 56990.4 
Turkcy• 2001Q2 4.0 4.5 6.6 10.0 •7.5 9.8 20083.4 33 237.4 
Not<'s: 
a. The period before the inOation targeting refer.; to the period of 1994 97 for 'Growth' and 
'CPI innation· for the Czech Republic. 
b. The period before the inllation targeting refers to the period or 1996 .. 98 for reserves in 
Brazil. 
c. The period before the inflation targeting refers to the period of 1994- 9 7  and after infla-
tion targeting refers to the period or 1999-2004 for unemployment rate in South Africa. 
Note that due to change in methodology anc.l data coverage, unemployment figures arc 
not directly comparable before anc.l after aparthc.:id. 
d. The period after the inflation targeting refers to the period of200'.l-·04 for unemployment 
rate in Peru. 
c. Ollicial adoption date for Turkey is 2006. However, Turkish central bank declared 'c.lis-
guised inllation targcting· in the aftermath of the 2001 February crisis. 
Source: IMF (2008). 
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Tahle /.3 Macroeconomic prices in the inflation targeting countri('s 
Bcrorc: Annual average of 5 years prior 10 adoption or IT: After: Annual average or 
adoption of IT lo current 
1 3  
Inflation rate l<�xchangc CB real Public 
(variations rate real interest assets reul 
in CPI) dcpreciationg,I' ratc"·i interest nitc•J 
Year IT Before Arter Before After Before After Before After 
started 
New Zealand 1990 1 1 .6 2.2 -7.6 0.6 7.0 5.5 2. 1  5.1 
Chile' 1991 19.7 7.2 -6.0 -4.0 0.0 16.0 -4.6 
Canada 1991 4.5 2.1  7.5 -1.7 6.0 2.6 5.8 2.5 
United 
Kingdom 1992 6.4 2.6 --2.4 2.2 5.4 3.0 5.0 2.8 
Sweden 1993 6.9 1.5 8.5 1.2 2.8 1.7 5.0 2.9 
Australia" 1994 4.2 2.5 -6.9 - 1 .  I 7.1 3.2 6.3 4.0 
Israel 1997 I 1.3 3.1 -4.2 0.9 2.0 5.0 1 .5 5.0 
Cwch 
Republic' 1998 9.1 3.1 -6.6 -6.2 1 .9 0.7 0.0 0.9 
Poland" 1998 24.1 4.7 ··4.5 -4.6 1.6 6.2 1 .8 I 1 .6 
Brazil 1999 819.2 7.9 -428.0 5.5 -782.6 15.7 -786.9 12.4 
Colombia 1999 20.4 7.5 ,9.5 0.5 18.4 6.6 1.5 2.0 
Mexico 1999 24.5 7.2 2.8 4.6 7.5 5.0 3.2 3.8 
Thailand 2000 5.1 2.2 4.5 - 1.0 4.9 1.6 4.7 3.1 
South Africa" 200() 7.3 5.1 4.3 -2 .5  8.6 4.4 7.3 4.2 
Switzerland 2000 0.8 1 .0 1.6 - - 3.7 0.2 0.1 0.9 0.3 
Korea 2001 4.0 3.3 6.0 - 5.0 -0 .2  -1 .0 6.5 2. 1  
Hungary 2001 15.2 5.9 2.5 ,12.4 2.0 3.4 2.3 3.4 
Peru 2002 5.0 I .  9 -1.6 1.4 9.3 2.0 3.8 · 0.5 
Philippines 2002 6.3 5.0 8.7 - 3 . 0  5.1 0.9 5.2 1.2 
Indonesia 2005 8.0 10.5 6.2 --1 .9 4.2 2.3 4.1 -2.4 
Turkey' 2006 28.3 10.5 - -6.3 - 1.2 1 1 .7 7.5 14.8 10.5 
Turkey' 2001Q2 74.1 28.3 -9.9 -6.3 -13.3 12.7 23.9 15.5 
Noll's: 
a. The period after the inna1ion targeting period refers 10 the period of 1993--2005; the 
period before the inOation targeting refers to the period or 1987--90. 
b. Treasury llill: the period after the inOa1ion targeting refers to the period of 1994 2000; 
CB Rate: the period after the inflation targeting refers to the period of 1994 ,95. 
c. The period before the inflation targeting refers to lhc period of 1994--97. 
d. Treasury Bill rates; the period after the inflation targeting refers to the period or 1 998 -2000. 
e. Treasury Bill: the period before the inflation targeting refers to the period of 1994- 2000. 
f. Ollicial adoption date for Turkey is 2006. However. Turkish central bank declared ·dis-
guiscd inllation targeting' in the aftermath of the 200 I February crisis. 
g. A rise in value indicates depreciation. Annual average market rate is used for: UK, 
Canada, Turkey, Australia, New Zealand. Brazil, Peru, Israel, Indonesia, Korea and 
Philippines. Annual average Ollkial Rate is used for: Colombia, Thailand, Hungary, 
Poland and Switzerland. Principle rate is used for: South Africa, Mexico and Czech 
Republic. 
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Tahle 1.3 (continued) 
h. Nominal values arc dcllatcd by the corresponding inllation averages (CPI column). 
i. Sweden, New Zealand, Canada: 13ank Rate; Mexico: 13anker's Acceptunce. 
j. Colombia: lnterbankaria TBS; Peru and Chile: Saving Rate; New Zealand Newly 
issued three months Treasury bill rah:s; Indonesia: three Months Deposit Rate: Korea: 
Natio11.1I Housing Bond Rate; Thailand: Government Bond Yield Rate. 
Source• : IM F (2008). 
extent Columbia, have pursued active export promotion strategies and 
maintained real depreciation; The Czech Republic, Switzerland and 
Hungary are observed to have experienced nominal currency apprecia­
tion, and Poland seems to have maintained an appreciating path for its 
real exchange rate. 
Clearly much of this generalized trend towards appreciation can be 
explained by reference to the increased expansion or foreign capital 
inflows due to the global financial glut mentioned above. With the IT 
central bankers announcing a 'no-action' stance against exchange rate 
movements led by the 'markets', a period of expansion in the global asset 
markets has generated strong tendencies for currency appreciation. What 
is puzzling, however, is the rapid and very significant expansion in the 
foreign exchange reserves reported by the IT central banky As reported 
in the last two columns of Table 1.2, foreign exchange reserves held at the 
central banks rose significantly in the aftermath or the IT regimes. The rise 
or reserves was especially pronounced in Korea, the Philippines and Israel 
where almost a five-fold increase had been witnessed. Of all the countries 
surveyed in Table 1.3, the UK and Brazil are the only two countries that 
had experienced a fall in their aggregate reserves.' 
This phenomenon is puzzling because the well-celebrated 'flexibility' 
of the exchange rate regimes were advocated precisely with the argument 
that, under the IT framework, the central banks would gain freedom in 
their monetary policies and would no longer need to hold reserves to 
defend a targeted rate of exchange. l n  the absence of any ofticially stated 
exchange rate target, the need for holding such sums of foreign reserves 
at the central banks should have been minimal. The proponents of the IT 
regimes argue that the central banks need to hold reserves to 'maintain 
price stability against possible shocks'. Yet, the acclaimed 'defense of price 
stability' at the expense of such large and costly funds that arc virtually 
kept idle at the IT central banks' reserves is questionable at best in an era 
of prolonged unemployment and slow investment growty.' and needs to be 
justified economically as well as socially. 
We now turn to the issue of exchange rate policy more formally. 
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l .3 THE ROLE OF THE EXCHANGE RATE UNDER 
INFLATION TARGETING 
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As stated above, part of the broader requirements surrounding the IT 
system is often argued to be the implementation of a 'floating/flexible' 
exchange rate system in the context of free mobility or capital. Thus, 
'exchange rate flexibility and floating exchange rate system' became the 
new motto, and to many advocates, central bank 'policy' has typically been 
reduced to mean merely 'setting the policy interest rate'. The exchange 
rate and macro prices are, in theory at least, thereby left to the unfettered 
workings of the global finance markets. The role of the exchange rate as 
an adjustment variable has clearly increased over the last decade since the 
adoption of the floating exchange rate systems. In the meantime, however, 
the role of the interest rates and reserve movements has declined substan­
tially as counter-cyclical instruments available to be used against shocks4 
(see Table 1.2). 
Against this background a number of practical and conceptual ques­
tions are inevitable: what is the role of the exchange rate in the overall 
macroeconomic policy when an explicit IT regime is adopted? Under 
what conditions should the central bank, or any other authority, react to 
shocks in the foreign exchange market? And perhaps more importantly, 
if an intervention in the foreign exchange market is regarded necessary 
against, say, the disruptive effects of an external shock, what are the 
proper instruments? 
To the proponents of IT, the answer to these questions is simple and 
straightforward: the central bank should not have any objective in mind 
with regards to the level of the exchange rate, yet it might interfere against 
the volatility of the exchange rate in so far as it affects the stability of 
prices. However nuances remain. To what may be grouped under 'strict 
conformists', the central bank should be concerned with the exchange rate 
only if it affects its ability to forecast and target price inflation. Any other 
response to the foreign exchange market represents a departure from the 
IT system. Advocated in the seminal works by Bernanke et al. ( 1999) and 
Fischer (200 I), the approach argues that attending to IT and reacting to 
the exchange rate are mutually exclusive. Beyond this assertion, the con­
fonnist view also holds that intervention in the foreign exchange market 
could confuse the public regarding the ultimate objective of the central 
bank with respect to its priorities, distorting expectations. In a world of 
credibility game, such signals would be detrimental to the central bank's 
authority. 
Yet, while maintaining the IT objective, one can also distil! a more 
active role for the exchange rate in the literature. As outlined by Debelle 
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(200 I), this 'flexible IT' view proposes that the exchange rate can also be 
a legitimate policy objective alongside the inflation target. More formally, 
an operational framework for the 'flexible IT' view was envisaged within 
an expanded Taylor rule.;faylor (2000) argued, for instance, that an 
exchange rate policy rule can legitimately be embedded in a Taylor rule 
that is consistent with the broad objectives of targeted inflation rate and 
the output gap. 
In contrast to all this, the structuralist tradition asserts that irrespective 
of the conditionalities of foreign capital and boundaries of IT, it is very import­
ant for the developing economies to maintain a stable and competitive real 
exchange rate (SCRER) (see, for example, Cordero, Chapter 3, this volume; 
Frenkel and Taylor, Chapter 2, this volume; Galindo and Ros, Chapter 8, 
this volume; Frenkel and Ros, 2006; Frenkel and Rapetti, Chapter 9, this 
volume). They argue that the real exchange rate can affect employment, 
and the economy more generally, through a number of channels: ( I )  by 
affecting the level of aggregate demand (the macroeconomic channel); (2) 
by affecting the cost of labor relative to other goods and thereby affecting 
the amount of labor hired per unit of output (the labor intensity channel); 
and (3) by affecting employment through its impact on investment and eco­
nomic growth (the development channel). While the size and even direction 
of these channel effects might differ from country to countr;!tnaintaining a 
competitive and stable real exchange rate is likely to have a positive employ­
ment impaihrough some combination of these effects. 
The gist of the structuralist case for SCRER rests on a recent (and 
unfortunately not well understood or appreciated) paper by Taylor 
(2004). Resting his arguments on the system of social accounting ident­
ities, Taylor argues that the exchange rate cannot be regarded as a simple 
'price' determined by temporary macro equilibrium conditions. The main­
stream case for exchange rate determination rests on the well-celebrated 
Mundell ( 1963) and Fleming ( 1 962) model where the model rests on an 
assumed duality between reserves (fixed exchange rate system) versus 
flexible exchange rate adjustments. The orthodox mainstream model, 
according to Taylor, presupposes that a balance of payments exists with 
a potential disequilibrium that has to be cleared. This, however, is a false 
presumption. The exchange rate is not an 'independent' price and has no 
fundamentals such as a given real rate of return (or a trade deficit) that can 
make it self-stabilizing. In Taylor's words, 'the balance of payments is at 
most an accumulation rule for net foreign assets and has no independent 
status as an equilibrium condition. The Mundell-Fleming duality is irrel­
evant, and in temporary equilibrium, the exchange rate does not depend 
on how a country operates its monetary (especially international reserve) 
policy' (Taylor, 2004, p. 2 1 2). 
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The preceding discussions clearly underscore that the real world behav­
ior of exchange rates is quite complex and the focus of the inflation target­
ing regime for Boating exchange rates (in expectation of dropping it from 
the policy agenda altogether) is a mirage. This view of exchange rates helps 
to explain why many believe that there arc no viable alternatives to IT as a 
mode of central bank policy. However, as this book tries to demonstrate, 
and as we brief1y discuss in the next section, this view or no viable alterna­
tives to inflation targeting is not correct. 
1 .4 SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE ALTERNATIVES TO 
INFLATION TARGETING CENTRAL BANK 
POLICIES 
One reason that 'inf1ation-focused monetary policy' has gained so many 
adherents is the common perception that there is no viable alternative 
monetary policy that can improve growth and employment prospects. 
There are two main factors accounting for this perception. First, as we dis­
cussed in the previous section, in an internationally financially integrated 
economy with high levels of international capital flows, monetary policy 
can be extremely challenging. In particular it might be very diflicult to 
gear monetary policy by targeting monetary aggregates, or by pegging an 
exchange rate along with trying to promote employment growth. This is 
often seen as the so-called 'trilemma' which commands that central banks 
can only have two out of three of the following: open capital markets, a 
fixed exchange rate system and an autonomous monetary policy geared 
toward domestic goals. While this so-called 'trilemma' is not strictly true 
as a theoretical matter, in practice it does raise serious issues of mon­
etary management (see the above arguments cited from Taylor, 2004 and 
Frenkel and Taylor, 2006). From our perspective, the real crux or the 
problem turns out to be the very narrow interpretation of the constraints 
of the trilemma: central banks are often thought to be restricted to choose 
two 'points' out of three. Yet, the constraints of the trilemma could as well 
be regarded as the boundaries of a continuous set of policies, as would 
emerge out or a bounded, yet continuous depiction of a 'policy triangle'. 
Thus even within the boundaries or the trilemma a menu of choices does 
exist, ranging from administered exchange rate regimes to capital manage­
ment/control techniques. In fact, many successl'ul developing countries 
have used a variety of capital management techniques to manage these 
flows in order, among other things, to help them escape the rigid con­
straints of the so-called 'tri-lemrna' (Epstein et al., 2005; Ocampo, 2002). 
In this section we report on a series of country studies undert1aken by a 
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team of researchers working on a Political Economy Research Institute 
(PERI) (University of Massachusetts, Amherst)/Bilkent project on alter­
natives to inflation targeting, as well as a United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) sponsored study of employment t!trgeting economic 
policy for South Africa. A range of alternatives were developed by the 
researchers, all the way from modest changes in the IT framework to 
allow for more focus on exchange rates and a change in the index of infla­
tion used, lo a much broader change in the overall mandate of the central 
bank to a focus on employment targeting, rather than IT. Some of the 
alternative policies focus exclusively on changes in central bank policy, 
while for other countries changes in the broad policy framework and in the 
interactions of monetary, financial and fiscal policy are proposed. Some 
incorporate explicit goals and targets, while others prefer more flexibility 
and somewhat Jess transparency. 
It has to be noted at the outset that 'inflation control' is revealed among 
the ultimate objectives in all country studies summarized below. Thus 
there is a clear consensus among the country authors that controlling 
inflation is important and desirable. However all agree that the current 
prescription insisting on 'very low' rates of inflation at the 2-4 percent 
band is not warranted, and that responsibilities of the central banks, par­
ticularly in developing countries, must be broader than that. Accordingly, 
the policy matrix of the central banks shculd include other crucial 'real' 
variables that have a direct impact on employment, poverty and economic 
growth, such as the real exchange rate and/or investment allocation. They 
also agree that in many cases, central banks must broaden their available 
policy tools to allow them to reach multiple goals, including, if necessary, 
the implementation of capital management techniques. 
Table 1.4 presents a summary of the alternatives proposed in the PERI/ 
Bilkent project and is discussed further in what follows. 
1.4.1 Modest but Socially Responsible Adjustments to the Inflation 
Targeting Regime 
Some of the country studies in the PERI/Bilkent project proposed only 
modest changes to the IT regime. In the case of Mexico, for example, the 
authors argue that the IT regime has allowed for more flexible monetary 
policy than had occurred under regimes with strict monetary targets or 
strict exchange rate targets (Galindo and Ros, Chapter 8, this volume). 
They suggest modifying the IT framework to make it somewhat more 
employment friendly. In the case or Mexico, Galindo and Ros find that 
monetary policy was asymmetric with respect to exchange rate movements 
- tightening when exchange rates depreciated, but not loosening when 
Table 1.4 PER!/ Bilkent a/tematires to inflation targeting project. su111111ar_r of policy reco111mendations 
Countr:r Ultimate targets Intermediate Strict target Tools/instruments Central bank: 
targets or discretion independent, 
integrated or 
coordinated? 
Argentina Inflation control. SCRER. interest Discretion Sterilization. reserve Coordinated 
activity level rate requirements 
and e mployment (other prudential 




- Brazil Inflation control. SCRER Discretion Interest rate . Integrated/ 'C 
export promotion. asymmetric coordinated with 
investment expansion managed float the fiscal and anti -







India GDP growth. Slightly undervalued Discretion Interest rate. Integrated 
inflation control. (competitive) capital 
export promotion exchange rate management 
techniques. if 
necessary 
Table 1.4 (continued) 
Country Ultimate targets Intermediate Strict target Tools/instruments Central bank: 
targets or discretion independent, 
integrated or 
coordinated? 
Mexico Inflation. SCRER Implementation of Discretion Capital management Integrated 
'domestic· inflation techniques 
measure. SCRER, 
'sliding floor· on 
exchange rate 
South Africa Employment Real GDP growth Strict Interest rate: Integrated 
"-' generation. inflation employment credit allocation 
;:::, control target techniques (e.g. 
(coordinated asset-based reserve 
with other requirements. loan 
institutions), guarantees etc.), 
looser capital management 
inflation techniques 
constraint 
Turkey Inflation control; Real interest rate. Discretion Capital management Integrated/ 
employment non-appreciated techniques if coordinated 
generation: solvency exchange rate necessary. labor-tax with the fiscal 
of public debt: reform. increased and employment 
consolidate and public investments objectives 

































Note: SCRER: Stable and Competitive Real Exchange Rate: Central Banks: integrated means integrated into governmental macroeconomic policy 
making framework: coordinated means independent but committed to close coordination with other macroeconomic policy making institutions. 
Source: IMF (2008). 
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exchange rates appreciated. This lent a bias in favor of an over-valued 
exchange rate in Mexicq;: ·so they propose a 'neutral' monetary policy so 
that the central bank or" Mexico responds symmetrically to exchange rate 
movements and thereby avoids the bias toward over-valuation without 
fundamentally changing the IT framework. In their own words, 'the 
central bank would promote a competitive exchange rate by establishing a 
sliding floor to the exchange rate in order to prevent excessive appreciation 
(an "asymmetric band'' . . .  ). This would imply intervening in the foreign 
exchange market at times when the exchange rate hits the 11oor (i.e. an 
appreciated exchange rate) but allows the exchange rate to float freely 
otherwise'. They point out that such a floor would work against excessive 
capital inflows by speculators because they would know the central bank 
will intervene to stop excessive appreciation. lf need be, Galindo and Ros 
also propose temporary capital controls, as do some of the other authors 
from the PERI/Bilkent project. 
In his study of Brazil Nelson Barbosa-Filho 2008 Chapter 7, (this 
volume) also proposed extending the IT framework, but in a more dra­
matic way. According to Barbosa-Filho: 'because of Brazil's past experi­
ence with high inflation, the best policy is to continue to target inflation 
while the economy moves to a more stable macroeconomic situation. 
However, the crucial question is not to eliminate inflation targeting, but 
actually make it compatible with fast income growth and a stable public 
and foreign finance'. 
Given Brazil's large public debt, Barbosa-Filho proposes that the tar­
geted reduction in the real interest rate would reduce the Brazilian debt 
service burdens and help increase productive investment. In terms of the 
familiar targets and instruments framework, he proposes that the Brazilian 
central bank choose exports, inflation and investment as ultimate targets, 
and focus on the inflation rate, a competitive and stable real exchange 
rate and the real interest rate as intermediate targets. Furthermore, in 
order to achieve these goals, the central bank can use direct manipulation 
of the policy interest rate, bank reserve requirements and bank capital 
requirements. 
Brazil is not the only highly indebted country in our project sample. 
Turkey is another case with that problem. Here too the authors raise con­
cerns to the conformist straightjacket of IT, and develop an alternative 
macroeconomic framework. Using a financial-linked computable general 
equilibrium model (CGE) for the case of Turkey, Telli et al. (Chapter 
10, this volume) illustrate the real and financial sectorial adjustments of' 
the Turkish economy under the conditionalities of the twin targets: on 
primary surplus to GNP ratio and on the inflation rate. They utilize their 
model to study the impact of a shift in policy from a strict IT regime, to 
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one that calls for revisions of the primary fiscal surplus targets in favor 
of a more relaxed liscal stance on public investments on social capital, 
together with a direct focus on the competitiveness or the real exchange 
rate. They further study the macroeconomics of a labor tax reform imple­
mented through reduction of the payroll tax burden on the producers, 
and an active monetary policy stance via reduction or the central bank's 
interest rates. They report significant employment gains due to a policy of 
lower employment taxes. They also find that the economy's response to 
the reduction of the central bank's interest rate is positive in general; yet 
very much dependent on the path of the real exchange rate, thus they also 
call for maintaining a stable real exchange rate path a la Frenkel, Ros and 
Taylor. 
Frenkel and Rapetti (Chapter 9, this volume), in the case of Argentina, 
show that targeting a stable and competitive real exchange rate has been 
very successful in helping to maintain more rapid economic growth 
and employment generation. In the case of India, Jha (Chapter 12, this 
volume) also argues against an IT regime, and in favor of one that 'errs on 
the side of undervaluation of the exchange rate' with possible help from 
temporary resort to capital controls. Jha argues that, to some extent, such 
a policy would be a simple continuation of policies undertaken in India in 
the past. In Vietnam Packard concludes: 'a strict inflation targeting regime 
is not appropriate for Vietnam. Inflation targeting's rigid rules constrain 
policy makers to operate in a framework that requires inflation to take 
priority over more pressing development objectives. Thus, a stable and 
competitive real exchange rate is a superior alternative, precisely because it 
sets as a target a key macroeconomic relative price that is realistic, sustain­
able and growth enhancing' (Packard, Chapter 14, this volume). 
1 .4.2 More Comprehensive Alternatives to Inflation Targeting 
Other country case studies propose more comprehensive policy alterna­
tives to simple inflation-focused monetary policy, including IT. Joseph 
Lim (Chapter 13, this volume) proposes a comprehensive alternative to 
IT for the case of the Philippines. He argues that the Philippines' govern­
ment has been seeking to achieve a record of dramatically higher economic 
growth, but that its monetary policy has been inadequate to achieving that 
goal. He therefore proposes an 'alternative' that 'clearly dictates much 
more than just a move from monetary targeting to inflation targeting' with 
the following proposals: (I) Maintenance of a competitive real exchange 
rate, either by pegging the exchange rate or intensively managing it as in 
South Korea. (2) Implementation of capital management techniques, as 
in China and Malaysia, to help manage the exchange rates. This should 
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include strong financial supervision to prevent excessive undertaking or 
short-term foreign debt, and tax based capital controls on short-term 
capital flows, as was used, for example in Chile. (3) An explicit statement 
of output and employment goals, as the central bank transits from a 
purely IT regime. (4) Incomes and anti-monopoly policies to limit infla­
tion to moderate levels. (5) Targeted credit programs, especially for export 
oriented and small and medium sized enterprises that can contribute to 
productivity growth and employment. 
These policy proposals in broad outlines are similar to those proposed 
by Epstein (Chapter 1 1 ,  this volume) for the case or South Africa, which, 
in turn, have been developed in a much broader framework and in more 
detail by Pollin et al. (2006). Pollin et al. developed an 'employment­
targeted economic program' designed to accomplish this goal, with a 
focus on monetary policy, credit policy, capital management techniques, 
fiscal policy and industrial policy. The purpose of the program is to reduce 
unemployment rate by half in line with the government's pledge to reduce 
the official unemployment rate to 1 3  percent by 2014.5 Here, 'employment 
targeting' replaces IT as the proposed operating principle behind central 
bank policy, and moderate inflatiqn becomes an additional formal con­
straint which the central bank must take into account when formulating 
its policies. 
1 . 5  CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
In this introductory chapter we have argued that the current day ortho­
doxy of central banking - ·  namely, that the top priority goal for central 
banks is to keep inflation in the low single digits - is, in general, neither 
optimal nor desirab!Vfhis orthodoxy is based on several false premises: 
l 
first, that inflation, in any magnitude, has high costs; second, that in a 
low inflation environment economies will naturally perform best, and in 
particular, will generate high levels of economic growth and employment; 
and third, that there are no viable alternatives to this 'inflation-focused' 
monetary policy. 
In fact, moderate rates of inflation episodes reveal to have very low or 
no costs; and whether countries where central banks have adopted formal 
or informal IT have not performed better in terms of economic growth or 
employment generation is a matter of dispute. Per contra, there are viable 
alternatives to IT, historically, currently, and looking forward. 
Historically, countries both in the currently developed and develop­
ing worlds had central banks with multiple goals and tools, and pursued 
broad developmental as well as stabilization goals. Currently, very 
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successful economies such as Argentina, China and India have central 
banks that are using a broad array of tools to manage their economies 
for developmental purposes. And looking forward, the PERI/Bilkent 
project on alternatives to IT and PERl's UNDP work on South Africa 
have developed an array of 'real targeting' approaches lo central banking 
which we believe are viable alternatives to IT and, in particular, do a 
better job than mere IT in balancing the developmental and stabilization 
functions of central banks. 
NOTES 
1. We arc indebted to Hasan Comer!, Luis Rosero and Lynda Pickbourn for their 
diligent research assistance. and to Roberto Frenkel. Jose Antonio Ocampo, K.S. 
Jomo, Geoffrey Woglom, Rcfet Giirkaymtk. James Heintz. Leonce Ndikumana, Arjun 
Jayadev and Robert Pollin for their valuable comments and suggestions on previous 
versions or the chapter. Research for this chapter was completed when Ycldan was a 
visiting Fulbright scholar al the University of Massachusctls, Amherst for which he 
acknowledges the generous support of the J. William Fulbright Foreign Scholarship 
Board and the hospitality of the Political Economy Research Institute al the University 
or Massachusetts, Amherst. We arc also grateful 10 the funders of the PER l/13ilkcnl 
'Alternatives to Inflation Targeting' project, including UN-DESA. Ford Foundation, 
Rockefeller Brothers Fund and PERI for their support. Needless 10 mention. the views 
expressed in the chapter are solely those of the authors and do not implicate in any way 
the institutions mentioned above. 
2. Note that with the use of the term 'conditionality' here we refer not to the IMF's stand­
by rules in the narrow sense of balance or payments stabilization. but to the broader set 
of reforms and structural adjustment agenda as advocated by the international linancc 
community and the transnational corporations. Often dubbed as the (post-) Washington 
consensus, the warranted set of policies range from IT central banks and llexible foreign 
exchange markets 10 broader institutional reforms such as flexible labor markets, priva­
tiiation and increased governance. See Williamson ( 1993) for the original deployment of 
the term, and Rodrik (2003) for further discussion. 
3. 8ra1.il's case is actually explained in part by the recent decision (I.tic 2005) or the Lula 
government to close its debt arrears with the IMF with early payments out of its 
reserves. 
4. Though note the one sided ever increase in the aggregate reserves of the central banks. 
The social desirability and economic optimality or this phenomenon in the aftermath 
of the udoption of floating exchange rate systems is another issue that warrants further 
research. 
5. As of March 2005, South Africa had an unemployment rate of anywhere from 26 percent 
to 40 percent, depending on exactly how it is counted. 
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